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Orthodox Panentheism: Sergius Bulgakov’s 
Sophiology
Uwe Meixner
1. Theism, Pantheism, Panentheism, Monotheism
Not only the use of language as a whole but also its philosophical use is chang-
ing all the time. For example, some philosophers start to use a certain philo-
sophical term in a sense which is not at all its original sense. In this sense, 
they misuse the term; but instead of censuring this, others imitate them; the 
misuse catches on, and soon the misuse becomes normal, and thus ceases to 
be a misuse—at least within certain philosophical circles. This is what hap-
pened to the term »phenomenology«: formerly, it was used by philosophers—
very properly, in view of its etymology—to designate a human science which is 
dedicated to the description of the phenomena (of some stripe or other); nowa-
days, many philosophers use it exclusively for designating something which, 
presumably, not only humans but also mice, bats, and even bugs have: phe-
nomenology (i.e., conscious experience, which is full of what-it-is-like).
And this—the replacement of the original use of a term by its misuse, 
which then becomes normal and ceases to be a misuse—is precisely what 
seems to be happening to the term »theism« these days. Formerly, it was 
used by philosophers—again, very properly—to designate a position which 
acknowledges the existence of at least one god. In fact, the present use of the 
term in such combinations as »polytheism,« »monotheism,« »henotheism,« 
or »tritheism« in no way contradicts this former use, and one would expect 
that the same is true of its use in the combinations »pantheism« and »panen-
theism.« But no: Quite a few philosophers nowadays believe that pantheism 
and panentheism are so far from entailing theism that these positions entail the 
negation of theism—also known (formerly at least) as atheism.
Contrary to this somewhat infelicitous replacement of an original mean-
ing by a new meaning (a replacement which can seem to turn pious Spinoza 
into an atheist), I will describe a version of pantheism/panentheism which 
is not only, in the old sense, theistic (as is Spinoza’s version of pantheism/
panentheism) but also prosopon-theistic (as Spinoza’s is not): a version which 
acknowledges a personal god, but no impersonal god. What I have in mind is 
the Christian panentheism of the Russian-Orthodox philosopher-theologian 
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Sergius Bulgakov (1871–1944). Bulgakov’s speculative theology, as will be seen, 
is thoroughly Christian and at the same time thoroughly panentheistic. In a 
sense which will become plain, it is a panentheism which is orthodox accord-
ing to the Abrahamic tradition (what Spinoza’s panentheism is not), and even 
orthodox according to the Christian tradition; it is another question whether 
Bulgakov’s panentheism is also Orthodox (it certainly is not quite Roman 
Catholic).
Note that it does not matter much whether one says »panentheism« or 
»pantheism«; for if these two terms are accorded their most reasonable in-
terpretations, then they—and, of course, also the corresponding adjectives 
»panentheistic« and »pantheistic«—are logically equivalent. It cannot be that 
there is a god with whom everything is identical; otherwise (by the logical laws 
of identity) this table would be identical with this shoe, which is plainly not 
the case. And it cannot be that everything is a god: plainly, neither this table 
nor this shoe is a god. Thus, two prima facie possible interpretations of the 
term »pantheism« are simply absurd. The most reasonable interpretation of it 
is this: »pantheism« designates the doctrine that the world is a god. Now, it is 
natural to understand the term »the world« in its most comprehensive sense, 
the sense according to which everything is in the world. Indeed, it is mandatory 
to understand it in this way if one wishes to interpret the term »pantheism« 
by making use of the term »the world«; if one used a less comprehensive sense 
of the term »the world,« then one would not do justice to the meaning of the 
word »pan« in »pantheism.« It follows that pantheism entails panentheism: 
If the world is a god, as pantheism holds, then—because everything is in the 
world (which is an analytic, broadly logical truth)—everything is in a god,1 just 
as panentheism holds. It also follows that panentheism entails pantheism: If 
everything is in a god, as panentheism holds, then—because everything is in the 
world—that god (in whom everything is) and the world (in which everything 
is) are in each other; which can be literally true—literalness being required at 
this level of abstract metaphysical discourse—only if they are (numerically) 
identical; hence the world is a god, just as pantheism holds.
Note also that panentheism (and therefore also its logical equivalent: pan-
theism) entails monotheism with respect to the concept of an all-including 
god (though not with respect to the concept of a god simpliciter). According 
to panentheism there is an all-including god: g; suppose there is another 
1   »Everything is in a god« is here to be taken in its logically strong interpretation: Some god is 
such that everything is in him (her, it), not in its weak interpretation: Everything is such that it 
is in some god. Only the logically strong interpretation of »Everything is in a god« is true to 
the normal sense of the word »panentheism.«
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all-including god besides g: g´. Since both gods are all-including, g´ is in g, 
and g is in g´. Therefore (according to the required metaphysically literal—
mereological—reading of »is in«), g and g´ are identical. Thus, the assump-
tion that there is another all-including god besides g is refuted and the final 
conclusion from the premise of panentheism is that there is one and only 
one all-including god. Monotheism with respect to an all-including god is not 
yet monotheism simpliciter, or (unre)strict(ed) monotheism: besides the one 
all-including god, there may be other gods, gods that are not all-including. 
However, for thinkers for whom the concept of an all-including god is the only 
legitimate concept of a god, it is indeed true that strict monotheism follows 
from panentheism. For them, monotheism simpliciter results from panenthe-
ism in virtue of the fact—just demonstrated—that monotheism with respect to 
an all-including god follows from panentheism; for, for such thinkers, the one 
all-including god must be the one god.
2. Spinoza and Bulgakov
Spinoza, the most famous pantheist in the history of philosophy (so far, at 
least), was also a panentheist and strict monotheist; in his metaphysics, the 
logical connections of the three »theisms« which were pointed out in the 
preceding section do certainly not fail to be manifest. Paradigmatically, in 
Proposition XV of the first part of his Ethica, he asserts of the One Substance: 
»Whatever is is in God, and nothing can be, nor can be conceived of, with-
out God.«2 There is a parallel of this in Bulgakov, who—presumably without 
having Spinoza in mind at all—asserts:
Nothing can exist outside God, as alien or exterior to him. […] There is only the 
one God in his divine Wisdom, and outside him nothing whatever. What is not 
God is nothing.3
Bulgakov does not mean to propose that what is not identical to the one God 
does not exist; for obviously there are many things which are not identical to 
the one God but exist nonetheless. He means to assert (with rhetorical empha-
sis) that everything (everything which is, everything which exists) is in God, 
and that what is not identical to God cannot exist, cannot be, without God. The 
2   My translation. For the Latin original, see (for example) Spinoza 1977: 34.
3   Bulgakov, Sophia. The Wisdom of God (Bulgakov 1993): 72 and 148; the italics and the 
capitalization—as all italics and capitalization (or lack of it) in quotations in this essay—are 
already in the edition quoted from (the reader may be sure of this).
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consonance in thought between Spinoza and Bulgakov is evident. In other re-
spects, however, the two panentheisms of these two thinkers are very different 
indeed. The difference is not that Spinoza is a pantheist, and Bulgakov is not:4 
qua panentheists, as we have seen, both thinkers are also pantheists (the two 
italicized words being accorded their most reasonable interpretations). The 
differences are the following: (1) Bulgakov employs more than one concept of 
a god, Spinoza only one (namely, only one of the god-concepts Bulgakov em-
ploys: the concept of an all-including god). (2) Bulgakov employs more than one 
concept of a world, Spinoza only one (namely, only one of the world-concepts 
Bulgakov employs: the concept of an all-including world). (3) Spinoza’s cos-
motheology is perfectly static; Bulgakov’s cosmotheology is dynamic and, as 
a consequence, has a historical dimension—which is completely absent in 
Spinoza’s. (4) For Bulgakov, a god must be a person; for Spinoza, a god must be 
a non-person; as a consequence, Bulgakov’s panentheism is prosopon-theistic, 
Spinoza’s is not. Obviously, this last difference between the two thinkers is the 
most important difference. In what follows, I will explore Bulgakov’s panen-
theism in some detail; keeping Spinoza’s panentheism in mind will certainly 
provide a useful point of comparison.
3. Two Christian Dogmas
Bulgakov developed his own panentheism—as a part of »sophiology«—
mainly in six theological publications: the so-called »minor« trilogy (The 
Burning Bush [1927/2009] on the Virgin Mary, The Friend of the Bridegroom 
[1927/2003] on John the Baptist, Jacob’s Ladder [1929/2010] on the angels), and 
the so-called »major« trilogy (The Lamb of God [1933/2008] on Christology, 
The Comforter [1936/2004] on Pneumatology, The Bride of the Lamb [posthu-
mously 1945/2002] on Ecclesiology).5 As a compendious source of Bulgakov’s 
views, I shall use his own outline of sophiology, Sophia. The Wisdom of God.6 In 
4   Due to thinking (locally) too small of the world, identifying it not with the all but with space-
time, Bulgakov does think that he is only a panentheist, not also a pantheist; see Sophia: 72.
5   The first number in the square brackets indicates the year of publication of the original 
work in Russian, the second number indicates the year of publication of its translation into 
English. The English titles are the titles of these published translations. (One of the English 
titles does not accord well with its Russian original: »The Burning Bush« should rather be 
»The Unburnt Burning Bush.«)
6   That book is the revised edition of a book published in 1937, The Wisdom of God: A Brief 
Summary of Sophiology, which itself is a translation from a (so far) unpublished manuscript 
in Russian.
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addition, I shall quote from The Lamb of God (and, finally, from a book called 
A Bulgakov Anthology).
Bulgakov’s panentheism seeks to be compatible with, and indeed to posi-
tively incorporate, two central dogmas of orthodox Christianity: the Dogma 
of the Trinity (the Nicene dogma), and the Dogma of the Two Natures in Christ 
(the Chalcedonian dogma). The Dogma of the Trinity (it can be found more or 
less explicitly expressed in the Nicene-Constantinopolitanian Creed) consists 
in the assertion that there are three divine hypostases—or persons: the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit—of one and the same divine ousia—substance, 
or essence, or nature.7 The Dogma of the Two Natures in Christ consists in the 
assertion that Christ is the incarnate second person of the Trinity (the Son) in 
two distinct natures (essences), one divine and one human, which natures are 
united in Christ »unconfusedly, immutably, indivisibly, inseparably.«8
Bulgakov rightly remarks:
We must here draw attention to the meager interest displayed in the doctrine of 
the one Ousia in trinitarian theology. […] It may even be said that the concep-
tion of Ousia has remained in the lifeless scholastic form in which it was taken 
over from Aristotle. It […] had been more of a theological symbol than a theo-
logical doctrine. Such a state of things could not last forever, and sophiology has 
come in our time to […] reveal the meaning of this symbol.9
Indeed, giving to the ousia of the Trinity—to the identical nature of the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit—the great measure of theological attention it de-
serves is a necessary (though certainly not a sufficient) condition for entering 
into sophiology and into Bulgakovian panentheism.
7   The consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the other two hypostases is left very much im-
plicit in the Nicene-Constantinopolitanian Creed (in contrast to the consubstantiality of the 
Father and the Son). But later the term »consubstantial [homoousios]« was extended to the 
whole Trinity (see Sophia: 24).
8   The quotation is from »The Definition of Faith of the Council of Chalcedon« (see Schaff 1900: 
262-265).
9   Sophia: 53 (fn). See also ibid., 24: »[T]he doctrine of the relationship between the tree 
hypostases […] has been to a certain extent elucidated in the process of the Church’s dog-
matic creativity. But […] the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Holy Trinity, as well as 
the actual conception of substance or nature, has been far less developed and, apparently, 
almost overlooked.«
Uwe Meixner - 9783957437303
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com05/18/2020 05:25:32PM
via Universitat Augsburg
210 Uwe Meixner
4. The Divine Sophia
The fundamental sophiological definition is this: The Divine Sophia is the un-
folded Divine Ousia (Divinity, Godhead), the one nature of the three persons of 
the Trinity unfolded as to content (Divine Wisdom) and manifestation (Divine 
Glory).10 Bulgakov differentiates between Wisdom and Glory as distinct but 
inseparable aspects of the Godhead (the Divine Ousia) in its self-revelation—in 
its unfoldedness, as one should say in order to emphasize the purely ontologi-
cal, entirely non-epistemological character of the self-revelation that is meant 
here.11 It is important to keep in mind that the fundamental relation between 
the Divine Sophia and the Divine Ousia is (numerical) identity, since, of 
course, the unfolded Divine Ousia is identical (as is the enfolded Divine Ousia) 
with the Divine Ousia. The relationship between the Divine Sophia and the 
Divine Ousia is, therefore, the same relationship as the relationship between 
the standing Socrates and Socrates (and the sitting Socrates, to boot), except 
for the fact that the different »ways of givenness« (to use Fregean terminol-
ogy) of the Divine Sophia (the unfolded Divine Ousia) and the Divine Ousia 
(simpliciter, »Ousia as such« [Sophia: 54]) have nothing to do with the passage 
of time whereas they do have something to do with the passage of time in 
the case of the standing Socrates and Socrates. Saying it far less clearly but in 
Bulgakov’s own words: »[U]sing an abridged and simplified terminology, we 
can say: the divinity in God constitutes the divine Sophia (or glory), while at 
the same time we assume that it [the divine Sophia, the divinity in God] is also 
the ousia [as such]: Ousia=Sophia=Glory.«12
It is evident from this quotation that the Divine Sophia can also be defined 
as »the divinity in God,«13 that is, as the Divine Ousia (Godhead) in God, in 
other words, as the Divine Ousia as hypostatized (had, possessed) by God. This 
second definition does not only cast light on the first—the Divine Sophia as the 
unfolded Divine Ousia—(for the unfoldedness of the Divine Ousia, in Wisdom 
and Glory, is seen to be due to its being hypostatized by God), it also displays 
the fundamental relationship between God and the Divine Sophia: Since God 
hypostatizes (has, possesses) his ousia: Divinity, Godhead, the Divine Ousia, 
10   Sophia: 31-33.
11   In defining the Divine Sophia, Bulgakov himself prefers to speak of revelation (rather than 
unfoldedness): »Sophia is Ousia as revealed« (Sophia: 54); »the two persons [the Word and 
the Spirit] together disclosing the Father in one revelation—Sophia« (Sophia: 98).
12   Sophia: 33.
13   For this definition, see also The Lamb of God (Bulgakov 2008): 107.
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he hypostatizes the Divine Ousia inevitably just as it is hypostatized by him,14 
which is by definition (the second one) the Divine Sophia—alias, again by defi-
nition (now the first one), the unfolded Divine Ousia (unfolded in Wisdom and 
Glory). Or as Bulgakov himself says it: »[T]he one personal God possesses [hy-
postatizes] but one Godhead, which is expressed [unfolded, revealed] at once 
in Wisdom and Glory.«15
But what is God for Bulgakov? The last quotation implies that God is a 
person for Bulgakov. In fact, Bulgakov—whether he would be ready to admit 
it or not—believes that the three persons of the Trinity, each hypostatizing 
the Divine Ousia (see the Nicene dogma), collectively constitute yet another 
person, the one God: »The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who are three 
distinct divine persons, together constitute one God.«16 Clearly God, thus con-
ceived of, is not identical with either the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit; he 
is the whole group, or »family,« of the three. And yet (see above) he is a person 
for Bulgakov and hypostatizes the Divine Ousia (and thereby, ipso facto, the 
Divine Sophia). The following quotation makes it explicit how the one personal 
God hypostatizes the Divine Ousia:
[T]he first thing one must say about the Divine Person is that, as trihypostatic, 
this Person is equally real in one hypostasis [of the Divine Ousia] and in three 
hypostases, that this Person is the pre-eternally realized reciprocity of love that 
totally vanquishes personal isolation and identifies three in one, while itself ex-
isting by the real being of these personal centers.17
Yet, the fundamental problem remains: If God is to be the entire Trinity and a 
person, then one is confronted (a) with the difficulty that it seems impossible 
that a group of distinct persons is a person (it would seem that three conscious-
nesses with three distinct subjects of consciousness cannot also be or form one 
consciousness with one subject, no matter how much high-quality love there 
is between the three subjects)18 and (b) with the difficulty that if the three per-
sons together were indeed another person (in spite of apparent impossibility), 
that then, undoubtedly, there would be a fourth hypostasis of the Divine Ousia, 
14   Consider for comparative illustration: Since I carry my load, I carry my load inevitably just 
as (i.e., precisely in the manner) it is carried by me.
15   Sophia: 32.
16   Sophia: 23.
17   The Lamb of God: 95.
18   But listen to Bulgakov, who is not touched by any such misgivings whatsoever: »These 
three centers in the Holy Trinity are equally real and equally subjects, so to speak. Each of 
them is a separate, equally divine I, but all three are one Divine I in its absoluteness—the 
consubstantial and indivisible Trinity.« (The Lamb of God: 190.)
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consubstantial with the other three—which is contrary at least to the spirit 
of the Nicene-Constantinopolitanian Creed. It seems that Bulgakov would 
have done better to let the Trinity be a non-person, just as every human family 
that consists of two, three, or more persons is (ontologically) a non-person. 
But then, if he had done so, who would have been the one personal god that 
not only Bulgakov but every prosopon-theistic monotheist—that is, in practice 
every believer in the Abrahamitic tradition—believes in?19
Be that as it may, Bulgakov is eager to rebut the objection (no doubt actually 
raised against his sophiology) that the Divine Sophia—the unfolded Divine 
Ousia—is a fourth hypostasis.20 He seems unaware of the fact that, according 
to his theological views, already the Trinity appears to be a fourth hypostasis. 
Yet Bulgakov does certainly not believe that God (for him, the Trinity) is a 
primary, non-derivative hypostasis of the Divine Ousia: God—the trihypostat-
ic, triune God: the Trinity—is a hypostasis (»a trihypostatic hypostasis«21) of 
the Divine Ousia only in virtue of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit being 
hypostases of the Divine Ousia. The Divine Sophia, in turn, is, by definition 
(the second one), the Divine Ousia as hypostatized by God—that is, as hypos-
tatized by each person of the Trinity; but it is, for all that, not a hypostasis at all. 
Being hypostatized does not turn the Divine Ousia into a hypostasis: by being 
hypostatized it does not become an individual which is bearer of an essence; it 
stays an essence. However, what hypostatization does do to the Divine Ousia 
is to make it be in a certain manner, namely, makes it be as hypostatized by the 
hypostatizer (i.e., unfolded in such and such a way):
The three persons of the Holy Trinity have one life in common, that is, one 
Ousia, one Sophia. Nevertheless this unity of divine life coexists with the fact 
that the life of each of the hypostases in the divine Ousia-Sophia is determined 
in accordance with its own personal character […]. One and the same Sophia 
is possessed in a different way by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit […] 
19   This question is, of course, pressing only for Christians, not for Jews or Muslims. What 
a Christian prosopon-theist, qua prosopon-theist, cannot do is to assert godhood of the 
Trinity and deny personhood to it (since for a prosopon-theist, although there is a god, 
there is no impersonal god). I suggest that a Christian (trinitarian and monotheistic) 
prosopon-theist had best accept only the familiar three divine persons (in this sense, 
three gods), one of which, however, is the one personal god in the highest sense, since he is 
the origin of the other two (and of everything to boot): the Father Almighty. He, I believe, 
is what a Christian (trinitarian and monotheistic) prosopon-theistic panentheism must 
refer to as God, and not the Trinity, as Bulgakov believes.
20   See The Lamb of God: 105; Sophia: 35.
21   The Lamb of God: 189.
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The tri-unity of the hypostases is reflected in the threefold modality of the one 
Ousia-Sophia of the Godhead.22
In the unfolding of the Divine Ousia into the Divine Sophia—which is the 
unfolded Divine Ousia—the Son and the Holy Spirit are the disclosing (reveal-
ing) hypostases, the Father the disclosed.23 Thus the Son and the Holy Spirit 
are, so to speak, closer to the Divine Sophia than the Father.24 This makes it 
possible to say such things as that the Son (or Logos) is »Wisdom in person,«25 
and that »the Holy Spirit too is Wisdom,«26 »the personal Spirit of Wisdom.«27 
But Bulgakov urges that the »is« which is used here must not be literally under-
stood as the »is« of (numerical) identity; it is the »is« of predication and of rep-
resentation at once: of representative predication: exemplariness (with respect 
to the revelation of the Divine Ousia). Indeed, one can say that »the Father, 
the Son, the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Trinity ›is‹ […] Ousia or Sophia,« but one 
cannot (within orthodoxy) reverse these »is«-statements,28 which shows that 
they are not literally identificative; properly understood, they are predicative: 
»Each of these [each of the triune hypostases] in its specific way possesses 
Sophia and in this sense is Sophia.«29 Those »is«-statements cannot be literally 
identificative because »Sophia […], once more, is not a Hypostasis, but only a 
quality belonging to a Hypostasis, an attribute of hypostatic being.«30
This latter Bulgakovian assertion, however, must be a massive understate-
ment; for a few pages further on, Bulgakov speaks of »the common scholastic 
misunderstanding which makes Wisdom no more than a particular ›prop-
erty‹ or quality, comprised in the definition of God, and therefore devoid of 
proper subsistence.«31 One might even conclude that Bulgakov is contradict-
ing himself here. This is not really the case; but it is certainly difficult to find 
the proper ontological place for Bulgakov’s Divine Sophia. For Bulgakov, the 
Divine Sophia is, indeed, not a hypostasis (that is, not an individual which is 
bearer of an essence); a fortiori the Divine Sophia is not a »fourth hypostasis.« 
However, »she too loves. […] Sophia loves God without being a hypostasis.«32 
22   Sophia: 37 and 38.
23   Sophia: 46, 98, 105-106.
24   Sophia: 52.
25   Sophia: 98.
26   Sophia: 46.
27   Sophia: 98.
28   Sophia: 52
29   Sophia: 53.
30   Sophia: 52.
31   Sophia: 54.
32   The Lamb of God: 105.
Uwe Meixner - 9783957437303
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com05/18/2020 05:25:32PM
via Universitat Augsburg
214 Uwe Meixner
And God loves Ousia-Sophia: »It is loved by the Holy Trinity as life and revela-
tion. […] All life in God, in itself, is love. […] Apart from this the tri-hypostatic 
relation between God and his Ousia is inconceivable.«33 Is the Divine Sophia 
then a person (though not a hypostasis!) for Bulgakov? Certainly not: »Sophia 
is not a person,« he declares.34 But he also declares: »[W]e must insist on the 
full ontological reality of Ousia-Sophia.«35 Then, what is the Divine Sophia?—
ontologically, in addition to what its (two) definitions say about it? From the 
following five quotations it emerges that the Divine Sophia is for Bulgakov the 
subsistent (though non-hypostatic) life of God: »Ousia, and therefore Sophia, 
exists for God and in God, as his subsistent divinity« [or equivalently: »exists 
for the persons of the Trinity and in them, as their subsistent divinity«]; »the 
nature of God (which is in fact Sophia) is a living and, therefore, loving sub-
stance, ground, and ›principle‹«; »Ousia-Sophia is the life of a hypostatic spirit, 
though not itself hypostatic«; »Sophia is not [a?] hypostatic being, but she is a 
living entity. The divine world is alive, for nothing nonliving can be conceived 
in God«; »Sophia […] is his eternal divine life.«36
Two difficulties need to be pointed out here: (I) In what does the fine dis-
tinction between »subsistent« and »hypostatic« consist such that the Divine 
Sophia is subsistent (an individual substance in some legitimate sense) but not 
hypostatic (not a hypostasis)? (II) How can the Divine Sophia be at once a life 
(that is, something that is lived) and alive (that is, living)? For answering these 
questions it does not help to be told that »the nature of spirit is not a thing, 
but a living principle, even though it is not personal.«37 Nor does it help to 
remember the following lines from a poem by William Butler Yeats: »O body 
swayed to music, O brightening glance, / How can we know the dancer from 
the dance?«38 For, do we really not know in the case in question, in the divine 
case, Those Who Live (»the dancers«) from The Life (»the dance«)? It certainly 
seems that we do distinguish two ontological sides here and are quite right 
about this. Bulgakov himself writes: »Ousia-Sophia is distinct from the hypos-
tases, though it cannot exist apart from them and is eternally hypostatized in 
them.«39 If this is correct, Ousia-Sophia cannot be two things at once: be what 
is hypostatized and be one of its hypostatizers; Ousia-Sophia cannot both be 
33   Sophia: 35.
34   The Lamb of God: 107.
35   Sophia: 55.
36   In the order of quotation: Sophia: 55, 35, and 34; The Lamb of God: 105-106; Sophia: 54. See, 
moreover, the quotation footnote 22 refers to.
37   Sophia: 34.
38   »Among School Children,« Yeats 1980: 117.
39   Sophia: 34.
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The Life and be among Those Who Live (those who live The Life). It would 
seem that Those Who Live are the three persons of the Trinity (and in a deriva-
tive, secondary sense also the Trinity itself) and that the Divine Sophia is The 
Life they live and love. This chimes well with Sophia being a non-person and 
a non-hypostasis, but it agrees ill with Sophia’s supposed ability to love God. If 
the Divine Sophia is not alive after all (since those who live in the divine region 
are, it would seem, only the three persons of the Trinity and, in a derivative 
sense, the Trinity itself), how can Sophia love, if only in a non-personal, non-
hypostatic way?40
The way out of this apparent impasse is to hold that the Divine Sophia is not 
only The Life, the divine life, but also has subsistence (hence individuality), but 
subsistence in a weak sense—subsistence in the strong sense would be hypo-
staticness, which Sophia has not. This non-hypostatic subsistence enables it to 
live and to love, to be a subjectum (hypokeimenon) of life and love—albeit in a 
modified, a non-hypostatic sense. Thus, the »fine distinction« between subsist-
ent and hypostatic that question (I) addresses is, in fact, a distinction within 
the concept of subsistence itself: it is the distinction between weakly subsistent 
and strongly subsistent (or hypostatic).
This, of course, is not yet a sufficient answer to question (I): one would still 
like to know what the fine distinction between weak and strong subsistence 
consists in. Well, perhaps this distinction is primitive, undefined—in fact, in-
definable. Then, in order to get used to it, it may help to consider that it is 
not an ad hoc invention; for the ontological situation of the Divine Sophia 
is by no means a singularity. An analogue of it is found in juxtaposing the 
humans with humanity as hypostatized by the humans. In contrast to the hu-
mans themselves, humanity as hypostatized by the humans is not a hypostasis 
(for otherwise it would be a human being, which it is not); yet one can say that 
it subsists (and is, therefore, an individual), that it subsists in a weak sense. This 
makes it possible to say, in a modified sense, that humanity as hypostatized by 
the humans lives and loves (though it loves not always what it should love). In 
the normal sense, however, it neither lives nor loves; in the normal sense, the 
humans, its hypostases, live and love (and not always what they should love). 
It is precisely this latter fact which makes it also true to say that humanity as 
hypostatized by the humans is the (loving) life of (all) the humans.
40   On Sophia’s non-personal, non-hypostatic love of God, see Sophia: 35.
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5. The Divine Sophia and the Creaturely Sophia
Even more than his identification of the Divine Sophia with the divine life, 
Bulgakov’s identification of »her«—the unfolded Divine Ousia—with the 
divine world brings out Sophia’s unfoldedness, Sophia’s richness. The two iden-
tifications may, in fact, go side by side, as in the following quotation: »The life 
of God in His Divinity, or the divine world as an objective and living principle, 
is precisely what Scripture calls Sophia, or the Wisdom of God.«41 But each of 
the identifications also occurs by itself, without the other, which fact has al-
ready been demonstrated for »Sophia = the divine life« and which, as follows, 
is also demonstrated for »Sophia = the divine world«: »Sophia as the Divine 
world, as the fullness of Divinity […], is not only the Wisdom but also the Glory 
of God.«42 For the purpose of discerning the panentheism in Bulgakov’s work 
and the character of that panentheism, Bulgakov’s identification of the Divine 
Sophia with the divine world is rather more telling than his identification of 
»her« with the divine life. The former identification becomes especially reveal-
ing of Bulgakov’s views if one takes into account what »the Divine world, as the 
fullness of Divinity«—the (in Wisdom and Glory) unfolded Divine Ousia, the 
Divine Sophia—comprises: »Sophia, as the ›world‹ of God, represents a ›pan-
organism‹ of the ideas of all in the all,« and »[t]he divine Sophia, as the revela-
tion of the Logos, is the all-embracing unity, which contains within itself all the 
fullness of the world of ideas.«43 A very momentous conclusion follows: If the 
Divine Sophia, the divine world, contains all ideas (that is, all types, all forms 
in the Platonic sense), really all of them, then the divine world (Sophia) must 
be—among other things44—the prototype of the created world, of creation, of 
»the world« (in the usual acceptation),45 which means »that the species of 
created beings do not represent some new type of forms, devised by God, so to 
41   The Lamb of God: 107. Consider here once more (because the instance is particularly strik-
ing, occurring in one and the same sentence) Bulgakov’s letting the Divine Sophia be 
at once a life and something living. There is a way to make (some) sense of this (see the 
previous section), but straightforwardly understood it is nonsense: a life does not live, and 
something living is not a life.
42   The Lamb of God: 108.
43   Sophia: 59 and 69.
44   This caveat is justified in view of what Bulgakov himself says: »That inner self-revelation 
of God which is described as fullness in reference to his Wisdom and Glory can also be 
defined as the ›world‹ of God in reference to the personal life of the Deity itself.« (Sophia: 
59.) The ideas in the divine world that concern the personal life of the Deity—of the three 
persons of the Trinity—are presumably not exhausted by the ideas in the divine world 
that concern the created world.
45   See Sophia: 65.
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speak, ad hoc, but that they are based upon eternal, divine prototypes.«46 Thus, 
the ground of the (created) world is the Wisdom of God (the Divine Sophia). 
»To admit this,« Bulgakov says, »is to affirm, in a sense, the fundamentally di-
vine character of the world, based upon this identity of the principle of divine 
Wisdom in God and in the creature.«47 Furthermore, he comes to the conclu-
sion: »The world exists in God: ›For of him, and through him, and to him, are 
all things‹ (Rom. 11.36).«48
However, understood literally, this conclusion does not yet follow. What, at 
this point, is in literal acceptation reached (that is, if one has followed Bulgakov 
so far and accepts his views) is this: The prototypes of the species of the created 
world are (not literally in God, not literally in the Trinity, but literally) in the 
divine world, that is, in the unfolded Divine Ousia, in the Divine Sophia, and 
»the [created] world bears within it the image and, as it were, the reflection 
of the divine prototype.«49 From this piece of prosopon-theistic Platonism it 
does not follow that, in particular, the world in time and space is (or exists) 
in God, in the (sufficiently) literal sense that literal panentheism requires. 
A fortiori it does not follow that everything, the world qua totality of being (and 
not only the space-time world and its parts), is literally in God. There is, thus, at 
this point still a considerable gap that separates Bulgakov from true panenthe-
ism.50 In order to close the gap, it will be necessary to make one considerable 
compromise: We will have to allow that any given x is already literally in God if it 
is literally in the unfolded Divine Ousia, the Divine Sophia (which is not God, as 
has become amply clear by now), or else if it perfectly exemplifies (in particular, 
perfectly hypostatizes) something which is literally in the Divine Sophia. Thus, it 
is true (let’s say it is true)—literally true—that »God contained within himself 
46   Sophia: 70.
47   Sophia: 71.
48   Sophia: 72.
49   Sophia: 64.
50   Bulgakov, to boot, locally—see Sophia: 72—confuses panentheism with space-time-
panentheism: the doctrine that the space-time world (everything in space-time, including 
space-time itself) is in God. Space-time-panentheism is certainly not logically equivalent 
to space-time-pantheism: the doctrine that the space-time world is God. In harmony with 
this non-equivalence, Bulgakov accepts—at Sophia: 72—space-time-panentheism—to 
his mind there: panentheism—and rejects space-time-pantheism—to his mind there: 
pantheism. There is nothing wrong about this from the orthodox Christian standpoint; 
but Bulgakov is wrong to believe that this is the correct general attitude of a panentheist 
vis-à-vis pantheism (compare footnote 4); it cannot be correct if panentheism and pan-
theism are taken in their maximal and most reasonable—their »true«—conception (as 
they are taken in this essay and, on the whole, also by Bulgakov); for then they are, as we 
have seen, logically equivalent.
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before the creation of the world the divine prototypes […] of all creatures.«51 
But it is true in virtue of these prototypes being contained in the Divine Sophia 
(which, too, is in God, but not in the same sense in which the prototypes are in 
the Divine Sophia; a transitivity of in-being is out of the question here).
Bulgakov asserts that the (created) world »exists outside God« on the same 
page (Sophia: 72) where he also asserts that »[t]he world exists in God.« He is 
not contradicting himself, since, at this point, the world’s »existence in God« 
is not meant literally by Bulgakov (not even meant by him in the extenuated 
literal sense just introduced): as we have seen, it only means for Bulgakov that 
the created world is an image and reflection of the divine world, rather in the 
sense of Plato and Plotinus. Bulgakov states this view also in the following way, 
and thereby gives a decidedly prosopon-theistic (therefore non-Plotinian) and 
sophiological turn to it:
[I]n creating the world […] from ›nothing‹ God […], in the divine Sophia, unites 
the world with his own divine life. Insofar as the creature is able to bear it, God 
communicates Sophia, the creaturely Sophia, to creation. […] Sophia unites God 
with the world as the one common principle, the divine ground of creaturely 
existence. Remaining one, Sophia exists in two modes, eternal and temporal, di-
vine and creaturely.52
If this—this prosopon-theistic Platonism—were all there is in the direction of 
panentheism in Bulgakov’s thought, then Bulgakov could, after all, not really 
be counted as a panentheist. But it is not all, of course.
6. Bringing the (Created) World Home
The last quotation in the previous section suggests that the creaturely Sophia, 
Sophia in the temporal mode, is identical to the Divine Sophia, Sophia in the 
eternal mode. That the Divine Sophia and the creaturely Sophia are identical 
is, in fact, Bulgakov’s view53—a somewhat rash view. For is it really true that 
the entire unfolded Divine Ousia—the entire Divine Sophia, the entire divine 
world—is reflected in creation? On consideration, the view that the creaturely 
51   Sophia: 64.
52   Sophia: 73 and 74.
53   See Sophia: 76. Bulgakow is unaware that there is no paradox in an identity with rather 
different modes of givenness (as Frege would say) of the identicals; for this reason, he 
thinks that the (alleged) »identity in distinction, and distinction in identity« between the 
Divine and the creaturely Sophia »is the primary and ultimate antinomy of sophiology« 
(ibid.).
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Sophia is a proper essential part of the Divine Sophia—namely, that entirety 
within it which is reflected in creation—seems closer to the truth than the 
simple assumption of their identity (see footnote 44).
Now, the divine world and the Divine Sophia are perfectly congruous with 
each other, are even (necessarily) identical, as we have seen. Numerical iden-
tity, however, is out of the question for the created world and the creaturely 
Sophia, as long as the created world is what it is and not, per impossibile, some-
thing else than it is—and it must be emphasized in this context that the crea-
turely Sophia is called »creaturely« qua being reflected in creation, but not 
qua being created, since it is an essential—and presumably proper—part of 
the uncreated Divine Sophia; whereas the created world is indeed something 
created—something created from »nothing.« Perfect congruence, in contrast, 
is certainly not out of the question for the two (which are necessarily two): the 
created world and the creaturely Sophia. Yet, so far, the created world and the 
creaturely Sophia are not perfectly congruous with each other—far from it; 
they are only on the way to perfect congruence; at present, their congruence is 
only rather partially realized:
The fundamental mark of the created world is becoming, emergence, develop-
ment, fulfillment. […] The world of becoming must travel by the long road of the 
history of the universe if it is ultimately to succeed in [perfectly] reflecting in 
itself the face of the divine Sophia, and be ›transfigured‹ into it. The creaturely 
Sophia, which is the foundation of the being of the [created] world, […] is at 
present in a state of potentiality, dynamis, while at the same time it is the prin-
ciple of its [the world’s] actualization and finality.54
Here we have the dynamical and teleological—and therefore temporal—
aspect of Bulgakov’s panentheism (which aspect is absent in Spinoza’s). 
History is metaphysically important to Bulgakov—who did take biblical escha-
tology seriously and was, moreover, a receptive reader of the German idealists 
(of Hegel in particular). In fact, there is according to Bulgakov a predetermined 
end to history: this end is the perfect congruence of the created world with 
the creaturely Sophia, which congruence ultimately—at the end of time—
matches the eternal identity of the divine world with the Divine Sophia. The 
end of history is, in other words, the perfect (that is, as perfect as possible) ex-
emplification of the creaturely Sophia by the created world—»pan-entheosis, 
or simply pantheosis, the complete penetration of the creature by Wisdom,« 
54   Sophia: 75.
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as Bulgakov puts it.55 This is God’s predetermined plan for the created world, 
which plan, nevertheless, is not deterministic:
God shall be all in all, and divine Wisdom fulfilled in the created [world]. This 
accomplishment has an inner inevitability and predeterminacy, which yet does 
not suppress created freedom. For that freedom is not substantive but rather 
modal; it determines not the ›what‹ but the ›how,‹ not the existence and final 
issue of the cosmic process, but only the manner of its accomplishment.56
The end—panentheosis/pantheosis—is already fixed from eternity, the way 
to it is not, but is a matter of creaturely—specifically, of human—free choice 
in the course of time, in history. For this reason the arrival of »the end of the 
world« may take a longer or a shorter time:57 its date is not predetermined but 
depends on human freedom. There are, indeed, »limits to the penetration of 
creation by Wisdom, involved in its [creation’s] freedom to develop«58—but 
only temporary limits; for »freedom unto evil has no substantive foundation, 
no resources to endure to eternity, and sooner or later must inevitably wither 
before the radiance of Wisdom.«59
Evidently, Bulgakov’s panentheism is an eschatological panentheism. But 
what is the point of this metaphysical »arrangement«? What is its deep mean-
ing, which may win heads and hearts and dispose Christians (first of all, 
Bulgakov himself) to believe in it? Bulgakov himself anticipates an acute criti-
cal question: »Is not the creation of the world, as it were, a sort of duplication 
of the divine Sophia?«60 The first thing that can be said in seeking to answer 
these three questions is this: »God created the world only that He might deify 
it and himself become all in all to it.«61 Thus, creating the world is not merely 
a matter of »the force of God’s love overflowing beyond the limits of its own 
being to found being other than his own«62 (although it is a matter of that, too). 
For the love of God for the created world is of a peculiar kind (as the second-
to-last quotation intimates); it is a love that ultimately raises up: a love »to the 
end that he [God, in the person of the Son] might […] raise the creaturely up 
55   Sophia: 147.
56   Sophia: 146.
57   See The Lamb of God: 436-437.
58   Sophia: 126.
59   Sophia: 147.
60   Sophia: 76.
61   Sophia: 136.
62   Sophia: 73.
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to the heavenly«63 (as Bulgakov puts it, speaking of the ultimate purpose of the 
kenosis of the Lord).
Now, for God there is no raising-up (of anything at any time) without first 
having thrown down (something at some time): if the former is to be accom-
plished by him, the latter must have been done by him first. Thus, what John 
Donne writes at the end of his »Hymne to God my God, in my sicknesse« is 
entirely appropriate metaphysically: »Therefore that he may raise the Lord 
throws down.«64 God’s creating from nothing is, metaphysically, a throwing-
down. This wording certainly has a negative ring to it. There are considerations 
that more than justify that wording. The questions at the beginning of the pre-
ceding paragraph become especially disquieting if one considers that there is 
a dark side to the proposed metaphysical »arrangement«: When Bulgakov says 
(as already quoted above) that »[t]he fundamental mark of the created world 
is becoming, emergence, development, fulfillment,« he could have added—
and he would have told the truth—that a very conspicuous mark of the cre-
ated world is also destruction, submergence, degeneration, frustration. Bulgakov 
is not blind to this; he is not blind to negativity, to evil: he imputes it to human 
(and angelic) freedom.65 Yet, in view of what we know about the world, this 
imputation is rather hard to believe to be true; for destruction, submergence, 
degeneration, frustration—and the staggering amount of pain and suffering 
they entail—and death seem natural features of the world. They were present 
long before the appearance of humankind, and they would have been present 
even if humankind had never existed. Angels do not seem to have anything to 
do with them, and what these features certainly seem not to be (except for very 
minor parts of them) is »wages of sin« (cf. Romans 6:23). But if they are indeed 
natural, how can the consequence be avoided that God, in creating, intended 
them? Are they not, in the main, consequences of the inexorable rule of the 
laws of nature, in other words, of the laws of God (enforced by God)? It seems, 
thus, that the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world ( John 1:29) is 
not only the lamb who takes away the sins the world—more precisely speak-
ing, its inmates—committed (countlessly many, doubtless), but that it is also 
the lamb who takes away the sin the world is66—committed by the world’s cre-
ator, by creating and upholding it: a necessary sin, necessary for the realization 
of raising-up love (without which God, who is Love, the paradigm of love, could 
63   Sophia: 89.
64   Gardner 1982: 90.
65   Sophia: 145-147.
66   Note in this context that the original Greek (of John 1:29) has the singular »the sin,« not 
the plural »the sins«: ἴδε ὁ ἀμνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ αἴρων τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου.
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not be),67 indeed of deifying love, but nevertheless a sin against the good, a 
wrong that must be righted.
7. Anthropocentric Panentheism
Bulgakov, however, appears to be far from these unorthodox ideas (although 
they are adumbrated in Schelling’s so-called Freiheitsschrift,68 which Bulgakov 
may have read). It is in their consequence that, like the creation and progression 
of the world to its end, so also the kenosis of the Son of God is a throwing-down 
(indeed, to the bottom of hell), but a throwing-down for love, terminating in 
a glorious raising-up. It is in their consequence that the divine-human drama 
of Christ, with its terrible climax and astounding anti-climax, is last but not 
least a just self-punishment of God for the sin of creating (a sin it seems to be, 
even though the creating is love-enabling), a divine expiation and atonement, 
which, in the end, becomes God’s true and glorious self-justification: the perfect 
theodicy—perfect not least because a form of love, raising-up love, is extended 
in it, first of all, to a person of the Trinity itself (which fact, without the drama, 
would not have existed); and perfect not least because amnesty and glorifica-
tion is handed to the sinning creature for free: raising-up love again—if the 
sinning creature wants it and accepts it. Bulgakov, however, seems far from 
these thoughts; instead, he merely repeats the orthodox Christian view (which, 
it would seem to me, is not the entire truth):
Many texts [of the New Testament] express the general idea that Christ offered 
the redemptive sacrifice in His blood and took upon Himself the sins of the 
world. This is a fact irrefutably attested by Scripture and just as irrefutably obvi-
ous for our immediate religious consciousness. In Christ we become reconciled 
with God. Christ is the intermediary for us; by faith in Him we recognize that we 
are justified before God.69
67   Love, and especially raising-up love, cannot be without negativity it overcomes, and an 
arena—the (created) world—is needed for negativity and the love by which it is over-
come. Thus it is quite true what Bulgakov says: »There is no God without the world« 
(The Lamb of God: 399), although there is no »natural necessity« to this world-God rela-
tion, only a »free ›necessity‹« (Sophia: 73): the necessity of love. Note, incidentally, that 
Bulgakov immediately adds the following remarkable coda to the sentence just quoted 
(from The Lamb of God): »and there is no world outside of God: the world is in God.«
68   The full title in English: Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom.
69   The Lamb of God: 343.
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This—the voluntary-scapegoat-soteriology, as one might term it—is the 
ground Bulgakov declares we (we human beings), and he among us, are stand-
ing on (though, of course, this is can be obvious to us only if we are Christians). 
It is a part of the conspicuous anthropocentrism of Bulgakov’s panentheism. 
This anthropocentrism goes much further than the anthropocentrism of the 
Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, where we read that because of us human 
beings and because of our salvation the Son—»true god of [from; out of] true 
god,« but certainly a god in a different sense than the sense in which the en-
tire Trinity is God for Bulgakov—descended from heaven and became himself 
a human being and was crucified for us. Already in the Creed it is all for us 
and because of us. In fact, Bulgakov’s anthropocentrism not only exceeds the 
Creed’s, it exceeds also the Bible’s:
[H]umanity [i.e.: humankind, the entirety of the humans] was really made to 
be lord of creation. […] Through humanity, created Wisdom can inform the 
formless elements, the tohu-bohu of matter, until it becomes an extension of the 
human body [!]. […] [A]ll in history can and must be wrought out by human-
kind in human fashion. For in Divine-humanity is included the whole fullness of 
humanity [i.e., the ideal human form], with its freedom and creativity.70
The created world belongs to humanity [i.e., humankind]. […] Humanity […] is 
the representative of all creation […] In this sense we may say the world is hu-
manity, which includes in itself the formality of all the rest. […] God’s image in 
creation is the human form. […] This ›image‹ is the ens realissimum in humanity, 
it establishes a true identity [a perfect relation of representation?] between the 
image and its prototype, which involves not only the ›divinity‹ of humanity on 
account of the image of God in it, but also a certain ›humanity‹ of God.71
Bulgakov makes the proud statement (no doubt in humility): »There is some-
thing in human beings which is directly related to the essence of God [i.e., 
the Divine Ousia].«72 What is it? »It is no one natural quality, but our whole 
humanity, which is the image of God. […] It lies within us, something as yet 
unrevealed, yet surely to be revealed, if only when ›God shall be all in all‹ 
70   Sophia: 140 and 141. Note that Bulgakov is of course not advocating humanistic triumpha-
lism (be it capitalist or socialist): »The Satanic principle in humanity is only strengthened 
by its unspiritual technical conquest of nature ›in its own name.‹« (Sophia: 140.) What he 
really has in mind (ibid.) is »a good and true humanization of nature, accomplished in the 
name of Christ.«
71   Sophia: 77 and 78. There are two deviations from this truth: »The secularist divorce of 
the human from the divine principle in humanity, with its sequel in the idolatry of the 
human, is an error; but equally false is the denial of the human principle in the name of 
the divine.« (Sophia: 141.)
72   Sophia: 79.
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(1. Cor. 15.28).«73 Now, according to »the doctrine of Divine-humanity or of 
Sophia«74 (which, no doubt, is the same doctrine as »the doctrine of Sophia, 
the divine Wisdom in creation«75), »the fullness of Divine-humanity shall be 
attained, when God shall be all in all.«76 From these quotations (which under-
score the dynamic character of Bulgakov’s panentheism) and previous exposi-
tions in this essay it can be gathered (a) that Divine-humanity is identical with 
the Divine Sophia (which is thus provided with yet another identification,77 in 
addition to its identification with the unfolded Divine Ousia, with the Divine 
Ousia as hypostatized by God, with the divine life, and with the divine world) 
and (b) that, therefore, the ideal form of creaturely humanity is contained in 
Divine-humanity (since every ideal form is contained in the Divine Sophia: 
in Divine-humanity), but is not yet fully realized, though it will be. Moreover, 
in the perspective of Bulgakov’s anthropocentrism (see »the world is humanity 
[that is, is epitomized by humankind],« quoted above), this creaturely human-
ity is a perfect representation of the creaturely Sophia: »[Creaturely] humanity 
is78 the created form of divine Wisdom,79 which [i.e., divine Wisdom] is simply 
God’s nature revealing itself [i.e., the unfolded Divine Ousia].«80 In its pres-
ent appearance, creaturely humanity—and thereby the creaturely Sophia—
is seriously impaired by the defects of its exemplifiers (bearers, hypostases): 
»Obviously, in humans, created Wisdom is obscured by sin.«81 As has become 
amply clear, this will not remain so forever.
73   Sophia: 79.
74   Sophia: 102.
75   Sophia: 114.
76   Sophia: 112.
77   Further evidence for this identification: »[T]he Son and the Spirit […] are two, yet the 
bond which unites them appears in the one self-revelation they share in Sophia, alike in 
eternal Divine-humanity in God and in the appearing in time among human beings of the 
God-human.« (Sophia: 102.) Moreover, Bulgakov speaks of »heavenly humanity, Sophia« 
(ibid., 99). No doubt, he is using the shorter name »Sophia« in abbreviation of the longer 
»Divine Sophia« (as he often does).
78   This cannot well be the »is« of numerical identity, it must be the »is« of (perfect pars- 
pro-toto) representation; it can therefore be replaced by »represents.«
79   Bulgakov should have said »the creaturely part of divine Wisdom« instead of »the cre-
ated form of divine Wisdom.« For the creaturely Sophia, which he is here referring to, is, 
properly speaking, not created, though it is creaturely by being exemplified by creatures; 
and it is not a form but a part of the Divine Sophia (Bulgakov even proposes its identity 
with the Divine Sophia, as we have seen in section 6).
80   Sophia: 88. It is not accurate to say that God’s nature »reveals itself.« Properly speaking, it 
is revealed by its hypostases.
81   Sophia: 88.
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8. The Work of Salvation
Bulgakov anthropocentric sophiology—»Divine Sophia as humanity«82—is a 
panentheism which is Christian; being Christian, it has not only eschatological 
but also Christological, Pneumatological and Mariological aspects. What will 
be fully achieved in the end—that is: the pan(en)theosis, the perfect congru-
ence of the created world with the creaturely Sophia (via perfect creaturely ex-
emplification of the forms in the creaturely Sophia), the greatest ontologically 
possible union of the created world with the Divine Sophia,83 with the divine 
world—is begun in the middle of time. It is physically begun in a strictly local, 
merely exemplary fashion; but spiritually, already some all-embracing work, 
too, is begun at that time: the work of salvation (and theodicy, I would add), 
resulting (among other things) in the freeing of humankind, and thereby of all 
creatures, to the real possibility of being ultimately raised up, of being deified. 
It is the work of Christ in Sophia, with Mary and the Holy Spirit as necessary 
helpers:
According to the sophiological interpretation of the definition of Chalcedon, the 
two natures in Christ correspond to the two forms of Sophia, the divine and the 
created. The created humanity of Christ[,] the God-human[,] came to him from 
the Mother of God. It belongs to her. In a true sense it is possible to say that 
she herself personally is this created humanity of Christ, that she is the created 
Sophia. […] [I]t is in this sense, as sharing the human nature of the God-human, 
that his holy Mother is the created Sophia.84
She is created Wisdom, for she is creation glorified. In her is realized the purpose 
of creation, the complete penetration of the creature by Wisdom, the full ac-
cord of the created type [better: token] with its prototype, its entire accomplish-
ment. In her[,] creation is completely irradiated by its prototype. In her[,] God is 
already all in all.85
Here, as so often in Bulgakov’s texts, there is reason to deplore Bulgakov’s indis-
criminate use of the word »is,« with which he is prone to connect non-literal 
senses, to the considerable detriment of clarity of meaning. To put it straight: 
Mary is, literally, neither identical to created Wisdom, the created Sophia, nor 
82   Sophia: 79.
83   By perfectly exemplifying a form in—literally in—the creaturely Sophia, x is perfectly 
exemplifying a form literally in the Divine Sophia (the creaturely Sophia being literally a 
part of the Divine Sophia), and hence x is in God, literally in God, as we have stipulated (in 
section 5).
84   Sophia: 126-127.
85   Sophia: 126.
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to creation glorified, nor to Christ’s created humanity.86 All that can be said 
literally (and truly) is that she, first among all humans, perfectly exemplifies 
(namely, is a perfect hypostasis of) creaturely humanity, creaturely human 
nature (»Christ’s created humanity«), and that she thereby, due to the onto-
theological centrality of humanness (implicitly confirmed by the Chalcedonian 
dogma), is a perfect representation (a living symbol, an epitome) not only of 
creaturely humanity but also of the creaturely Sophia (because creaturely 
humanity—perfectly exemplified by Mary—is a representative part of the 
creaturely Sophia) and of creation glorified (because Mary—perfectly exem-
plifying creaturely humanity—is a representative part of creation glorified). 
Only in a non-literal, in a representational sense, can it be said that in Mary cre-
ation is »completely irradiated by its prototype«—that is, made perfect vis-à-
vis its ideal, the creaturely Sophia—and that in Mary »God is already all in all.«
Still non-literally, still merely representationally, but certainly in a more tell-
ing, more »encompassing« way than in Mary alone, God—for Bulgakov: the 
Trinity—is already all in all in the risen Christ; who risen (and raised up) is no 
longer kenotic and, anyhow (kenosis or not), has all the time (according to 
orthodoxy) been both a perfect hypostasis of the unfolded Divine Ousia (of the 
Divine Sophia, of Divine-humanity), just like the Father and the Holy Spirit, 
and a perfect hypostasis of creaturely humanity, just like Mary (»[h]er human-
ity became his [the Son’s] humanity«87). The Holy Spirit in this local and ex-
emplary beginning of pan(en)theosis, in this singularity in the middle of time, 
cannot be separated from Mary or from Christ; for the Annunciation and the 
Incarnation, in which the Holy Spirit essentially participates, are the beginning 
of that beginning:
In the Annunciation both the Word and the Spirit are sent from the Father to 
reveal Sophia to the world, and thus to reveal, in the earthly, the heavenly hu-
manity. The next point to note in this mystery is that the Spirit must come on 
the Virgin, and be accepted by her, before she can conceive and give flesh to the 
Word. […] In the Incarnation, the Son and the Spirit come down from heaven 
together, for the Spirit, who rests on the Son inseparably and unconfusedly, in 
his descent on the Virgin brings down the Word too in person, in virtue of which 
she, conceiving the Son, becomes the birthgiver of God.88
86   To repeat (see footnote 79): the use of the word »creaturely« instead of the word 
»created« would have been more adequate to the truth.
87   Sophia: 116.
88   Sophia: 101.
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In all of this, »[t]he originating Hypostasis throughout remains, as before in 
all missions ad extra, the Father.«89 Presumably, therefore, the Father knows 
what is the ground of the necessity of What is not assumed [by God] is not 
healed [redeemed by God]—the principle of Gregory of Nazianzus, which has 
almost universally (among Christians) been supposed to govern the mission 
of all missions. To a Christian (but not to a Jew or Muslim), the necessity of 
Gregory’s principle may at first seem obvious; on thinking about it, it may 
become more and more enigmatic. Why couldn’t God save (heal, redeem) us 
without assuming—in the second Divine Person—our nature? In contrast, the 
necessity of the following principle can only be, and remain, immediately evi-
dent: What is not thrown down [initially by God] is not raised up [ultimately by 
God]. Far as this latter principle may be from the Orthodox mind of Bulgakov 
(though apparently not from the Anglican mind of John Donne), it neverthe-
less seems worthwhile to rethink the mission of all missions in its light.90
9. Panpsychism?
Prima facie panpsychism is the thesis that everything has mental states. Since 
neither non-objects, nor abstract entities, nor merely possible entities, nor im-
possible entities seem at all capable of having mental states, and since it is not 
absolutely certain that there are no entities which are non-objects, no entities 
which are abstract, no entities which are merely possible, and no entities which 
are impossible, it is recommendable to formulate the thesis of panpsychism in 
a less general way than seems right prima facie, as follows: Every actual con-
crete object has mental states. Yet even this restricted version of panpsychism 
may still assert too much: Does an actually existing table or stone have mental 
states? That they have mental states seems somewhat doubtful. Perhaps the 
thesis of panpsychism should, therefore, be put in the following way: Every 
actual concrete object which is a fundamental entity has mental states.
No matter which of the three formulations of panpsychism is chosen, it is 
obvious that panentheism—the thesis that everything is in a god (this thesis 
being taken in its logically strong interpretation: see footnote 1)—does not 
logically entail panpsychism, nor is logically entailed by it. Nevertheless, it 
turns out that Bulgakovian panentheism is not without Bulgakovian panpsy-
chism. What Bulgakovian panentheism amounts to has been amply described 
in the previous sections. But what, now, is Bulgakovian panpsychism? The key 
89   Sophia: 102.
90   More on this matter can be found in Meixner 2017.
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to answering this question is the fact that the Divine Sophia—the unfolded 
divine essence—is alive and conscious for Bulgakov91 (because, according to 
him, it is alive and loving God: see section 4). We may take it that the creaturely 
Sophia, too—which Bulgakov identifies with the Divine Sophia (see section 6) 
and which, in any case, is certainly not something that could exist apart from 
the Divine Sophia—is alive and conscious for Bulgakov. Therefore, in the 
pan(en)theosis, when the created world will be brought into perfect congru-
ence with the creaturely Sophia (that is, will enter into its maximal ontologi-
cal nearness to the creaturely Sophia, and thereby also to the Divine Sophia), 
the created world—»nature,« »the cosmos«—will certainly be as alive and 
conscious as it can possibly be, in all its parts. However, the created world is 
alive—certainly in a consciousness-implying sense—even now, although this 
fact is presently obscured by sin, obscured to the point that the created world 
appears to be dead (and, doubtless, is dead in some measure). Bulgakov had a 
vision—or rather, a strong intimation—of the resilient aliveness of the creat-
ed world (and it proved to be the first step of his long way back to the Christian 
faith):
This was my first sight of the mountains. I looked with ecstatic delight at their 
rising slopes. I drank in the light and the air of the steppes. I listened to the rev-
elation of nature. My soul was accustomed to the dull pain of seeing nature 
as a lifeless desert and of treating its surface beauty as a deceptive mask. […] 
Suddenly, in that evening hour, my soul was joyfully stirred. I started to wonder 
what would happen if the cosmos were not a desert and its beauty not a mask 
of deception—if nature were not death, but life. If he existed, the merciful and 
loving Father, if nature was the vesture of his love and glory …92
This, if anything, is Bulgakovian panpsychism, and no doubt, it is orthodox 
panpsychism.
91   The Neo-platonic origin of this idea is obvious if one considers what Plotinus has to say 
about the νοῦς: »Admiring the world of sense as we look out upon its vastness and beauty 
and the order of its eternal march, thinking of the gods within it, seen and hidden, and 
the celestial spirits and all the life of animal and plant, let us mount to its archetype, to 
the yet more authentic sphere: there we are to contemplate all things as members of the 
Intellectual—eternal in their own right, vested with a self-springing consciousness and 
life—and, presiding over all these, the unsoiled Intelligence and the unapproachable wis-
dom.« (Plotinus 1991 [Ennead V.1, 4]: 351.) The Divine Sophia (with the creaturely Sophia 
as part of it) is—among other things it is—the Christian form of the pagan Neo-platonic 
νοῦς.
92   Bulgakov 1976: 10.
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